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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY
ARTICLE 2- LIIiTATIONS OF TIME
CPLR 203(b): Employer and employee are "united in interest."
CPLR 203(b) provides, in part, that "a claim asserted in
the complaint is interposed against the defendant or a co-defendant
united in interest with him when: 1. the summons is served upon
the defendant." While the term united in interest has proven
difficult to apply,' Prudential Insurance Co. V. Stone s offers the
most often relied upon definition: "if the interest of the parties in
the subject matter is such that they stand or fall together and that
judgment against one will similarly affect the other then they are
'otherwise united in interest.'" 3
In Modica v. Westchester Rockland Newspapers, Inc.,4 a libel
action was commenced against both the newspaper and writer of
an allegedly libelous article by service of summons and complaint on
the defendant newspaper. 5 Regarding the defendants' relationship
as one of employer-employee, the court held the service sufficient
to toll the running of the statute against the defendant writer.
On several occasions an employer-employee relationship has
been held to evidence unity of interest.6 Modica, therefore, indicates
another example for the application of this principle.
ARTICLE 3- JURISDICTION AND SEiRvicE, APPEARANCE AND
CHoicE OF COURT
CPLR 302(a)(1): Further examination of "transaction of
business" concept.
CPLR 302 (a) (1) provides that personal jurisdiction may be
had of a non-domiciliary defendant where the cause of action arises
out of the "transaction of business" by the defendant within the
'1 WElNsTmN, Koax & Mnzm, NEv Yoiuc CML PRACrcEZ 203.06(1967).
2270 N.Y. 154, 200 N.E. 679 (1936).
3 Id. at 159, 200 N.E. at 680.
454 Misc. 2d 1086, 283 N.Y.S2d 939 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County
1967).
G In Shaw v. Cock, 78 N.Y. 184 (1879), the Court held that for service
to be valid as to other defendants united in interest, all defendants must
be named in the summons as parties. However, as in the instant case, a
person can be named fictitiously if his true identity cannot be determined.
Plumitallo v. 1407 Broadway Realty Corp., 279 App. Div. 1019, 111
N.Y.S.2d 720 (2d Dep't 1952) (mem.); Halucha v. Jockey Club, 31 Misc.
2d 186, 220 N.Y.S.2d 567 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1961) (dictum).
6E.g., Plumitallo v. 1407 Broadway Realty Corp., 279 App. Div. 1019,
111 N.Y.S.2d 720 (2d Dep't 1952) (mem.) (service on corporation for
which the defendant was employed); Diver v. Jewish Hospital of Brooklyn,
18 Misc. 2d 231, 188 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1959) (service
on hospital in which defendant was doctor).
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state. The somewhat elusive concept of "transaction of business"
has given rise to much litigation.
In determining whether or not there is a transaction of busi-
ness, the New York Court of Appeals has laid down certain guide-
lines, which, while helpful, by no means conclusively resolve any
particular case. The Court, in Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v.
Barnes & Reinecke, Inc.,7 has adopted the language of Interna-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington 8 so that, in order to obtain in
personam jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant, it must be
shown that there were
certain minimum contacts with [the state] such that the maintenance
of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice.' 9
However, in McKee Electric Co. v. Rauland Borg Corp.,10 the
Court stated that "[t] here is no fixed standard by which to meas-
ure the minimum contacts required to sustain jurisdiction. . .. " 'I"
The following three cases illustrate separate attempts by lower
courts to determine what purposeful acts 12 will be construed as
amounting to a transaction of business.
In Hubbard, Westervelt & Mottelay, Inc. v. Harsh Building
Co., 3 the non-resident defendant executed and delivered, in Ari-
zona, a note payable to plaintiff in seven installments in New York.
The note was given for services rendered by the plaintiff in obtain-
ing a mortgage commitment from a New York bank to finance
the purchase and development of land in Arizona. The court
held that there was no transaction of business to satisfy in per-
sonam jurisdiction based upon service of process on the defendant
outside of New York.
The court found G. Benedict Corp. v. Epstein I4 to be against
the weight of authority and distinguished Banco Espanol de Credito
v. Pierre S. DuPont,15 cases which were relied upon by the dissent
7 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965).
8326 U.S. 310 (1945).
9 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945);
Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 443,
451, 209 N.E.2d 68, 71-72, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 13 (1965).
1020 N.Y.2d 377, 229 N.E.2d 604, 283 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1967).
11 Id. at 381, 229 N.E.2d at 607, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 37.
12"[I]t is essential in each case that there be some act by which the
defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws."
Longines-Wittnauer v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 443, 451-52, 209
N.E.2d 68, 72, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 14 (1965), quoting from Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
1328 App. Div. 2d 295, 284 N.Y.S.2d 879 (1st Dep't 1967).
1447 Misc. 2d 316, 262 N.Y.S.2d 726 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1965).
1 24 App. Div. 2d 445, 261 N.Y.S.2d 233 (1st Dep't 1965) (per curiam).
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to sustain jurisdiction. In Benedict, the court found that a default
on a note executed in Massachusetts but payable in New York
was a transaction of business on the theory that the performance
(paanent) was to take place in New York. In Banco Espanol,
defendant executed notes as an accommodation endorser in Dela-
ware in order to make credit available to two partnerships, of
which defendant was a special partner, for the production of motion
pictures in Spain. The partnerships existed under the laws of
New York and were transacting business there. The court felt that
the additional contacts of the partnerships with New York made
Bawo Espanol inapplicable to the instant case.
It would appear that the recent determination by the first de-
partment is sound in light of the New York Court of Appeals'
treatment of CPLR 302 (a) (1).
The second case, Maggio v. Gym Master Co., 6 involved a
physical education teacher who was injured while using a set of
"still rings." The rings had been ordered from a New York com-
pany which in turn had ordered them from Gym Master Company,
a Colorado corporation, by catalog number. Gym Master in turn
ordered the rings from another corporation which placed the order
with the manufacturer, who actually "drop-shipped" the rings to
the high school. Notwithstanding the fact that the New York
corporation ordered the rings by catalog number and that the
defendant Colorado corporation admitted such fact, the court held
that the activities were insufficient to constitute a transaction of
business. The court stated:
Plaintiff has not shown that the catalog used by School-Equipment,
Inc. [New York corporation], was circulated in New York by defend-
ant Gym Master. Neither has there been any showing that Gym
Master circulated any other catalogs or promotional material within
the State.17
The case appears to follow prior decisions with respect to
transaction of business. While the Court of Appeals has held
that "mere shipment" of goods into the state is not sufficient for
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant, 3 such shipment coupled
with the solicitation of business in New York by means of cata-
logs, advertisements or other promotional material will be a suffi-
cient jurisdictional predicate.' 9 The instant case appears to fall
into the "mere shipment" category.
1654 Misc. 2d 845, 283 N.Y.S.2d 436 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1967).
1Id. at 847, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 438 (emphasis added).
'
8 Kramer v. Vogl, 17 N.Y.2d 27, 215 N.E.2d 159, 267 N.Y.S.2d 900
(1966).
'9Singer v. Walker, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8
(1965).
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The third case, Bard v. Steele,20 involved a non-resident
defendant who maintained a direct New York telephone line to
its New Jersey office and had a great number of customers in
New York. The telephone line was used in the transaction out of
which the present suit arose.
The court reasoned that the mere fact of carrying on a great
deal of business with New York residents was not a sufficient
minimum contact, but when the factor of a New York line listed
in a New York directory was added, a sufficient jurisdictional basis
was established. That is, these elements taken together were con-
sidered by the court as amounting to a purposeful act which evi-
denced the defendant's intention to avail himself of the privilege
of conducting activities within the state and to invoke the benefits
and protections of its laws.
The case is questionable in the light of past decisions. While
it is true that courts do consider a telephone listing in the state as
a factor in determining whether or not a non-resident is trans-
acting business within the state,2 1 it appears that in order to find
a transaction of business, the listing must be coupled with other
factors. As Kramer v. Vogl,22 held, CPLR 302 (a) (1) will not
apply to a non-resident who never comes into New York and who
only sends goods into New York pursuant to orders from within
the state. Therefore, the significant fact in the instant case seems
to be that the defendant maintained a direct line and telephone list-
ing in New York.
While this may be within the proper scope of due process
requirements, it should be noted that the Court of Appeals has
thus far refused to expand the scope of 302(a) (1) to its full
constitutional limit.23  It should be kept in mind what the Court
said in McKee Electric Co. v. Rauland Borg Corp. 4
In our enthusiasm to implement the reach of the long-arm statute
(CPLR 302), we should not forget that defendants, as a rule, should
be subject to suit where they are normally found, that is at their pre-
eminent headquarters, or where they conduct substantial general busi-
ness activity. Only in a rare case should they be compelled to answer
a suit in a jurisdiction with which they have the barest of contact.2-
2028 App. Div. 2d 193, 283 N.Y.S.2d 930 (3d Dep't 1967).
21 City of New York v. Continental Vitamin Corp., 254 F. Supp. 845
(S.D.N.Y. 1966); Standard Wine & Liquor Co. v. Bombay Spirits Co., 20
N.Y.2d 13, 228 N.E.2d 367, 281 N.Y.S.2d 299 (1967).
2217 N.Y.2d 27, 215 N.E.2d 159, 267 N.Y.S.2d 900 (1966).
23 See Te Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 41 ST. JoHN's L.
RFrv. 279, 292 (1966).
2 20 N.Y.2d 377, 229 N.E.2d 604, 283 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1967).25Id. at 383, 229 N.E.2d at 607-08, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 38.
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Moreover, it should be expected that any jurisdiction exer-
cised by New York courts over non-domiciliaries will be reciprocal-
ly exercised by foreign courts over New York domiciliaries.2
CPLR 302(a)(3): Held non-applicable if original
injury occurs without the state.
In order to obtain personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary
under CPLR 302(a) (3), defendant must:
(1) regularly do or solicit business in New York, or
(2) engage in a persistent course of conduct within the
State, or derive substantial revenue from goods used or
consumed or services rendered in New York.
Or, the defendant must:
(1) expect or should reasonably expect the act to have con-
sequences in New York, and
(2) derive substantial revenue from interstate or inter-
national commerce.2 7
Subdivision (a) (3) of the section was added in 1966 after
having been recommended by the Judicial Conference. The Con-
ference made the recommendation after the New York Court of
Appeals, in, Feathers v. McLucas,2 had narrowly construed CPLR
302(a) (2) by requiring the tortious act, as contrasted with the
resulting injury, to be committed within the state. CPLR
302 (a) (2) was therefore unavailable to reach a non-domiciliary,
not doing business or transacting business in New York, who,
through an act or omission without the state, caused a tortious
injury within the state.29
In Black v. Oberle Rentals, !nw., 3° a third-party defendant
moved to dismiss the complaint against it for lack of jurisdiction.
The third-party defendant was an Indiana corporation, not au-
thorized to do business in New York, who manufactured parts
used in a trailer unit which jack-knifed in Massachusetts resulting
in consequential damages to the New York plaintiff.
In dismissing the action against the third-party defendant,
the court held that in order to predicate jurisdiction on CPLR
302(a) (3), the original injury had to occur within the state.
20A. Miliner Co. v. Noudar, Ltd., 24 App. Div. 2d 326, 329, 266
N.Y.S.2d 289, 294 (1st Dep't 1966).
27 CPLR 302(a) (3) (i) and (ii).
2- 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965).
20 See 1 WEINsTIN, KoRN & MILLER, NEW YoRK CIVIL PRACTICE
f1302.10b (1967).
2055 Misc. 2d 398, 285 N.Y.S.2d 226 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1967).
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